Superior Court of New Jersey,Appellate Division.
In the Matter of Mario LALAMA.
Submitted July 24, 2001.
Decided Aug. 10, 2001.
City sought judicial review of decision by the Merit System Board, which rejected the removal of a city firefighter for alleged drug use. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, Skillman, P.J.A.D., held that city established sufficient chain of custody for urine sample used in drug test.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 788
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak788 k. Determination Supported by Evidence in General. Most
Cited Cases
An
appellate court's review of an administrative agency's findings of fact is
limited to a determination of whether those findings are supported by
sufficient credible evidence in the record; however, an appellate court's
review is not simply a pro forma exercise in which the court rubber-stamps
findings that are not reasonably supported by the evidence.
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 741
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15Ak741 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Appellate
courts must engage in a careful and principled consideration of an
administrative agency's record and findings.
[3] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 784.1
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak784.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
In a case
where an administrative agency's findings of fact are contrary to the findings
of the ALJ who heard the case, there is a particularly strong need for careful
appellate review.
[4] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 784.1
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak784.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Although
an agency is not required to defer to an ALJ's findings, it is not free to
brush aside or disregard them without comment.
[5] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 787
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak787 k. Credibility. Most
Cited Cases
If an
administrative agency's fact finding is based on the credibility of witnesses,
a reviewing court need give no deference to the agency on the credibility
issue.
[6] Municipal Corporations 268 198(3)
268 Municipal Corporations
268V Officers, Agents, and Employees
268V(B) Municipal Departments and Officers Thereof
268k193 Fire
268k198 Suspension and Removal of Firemen
268k198(3) k. Proceedings. Most
Cited Cases
City made
required showing of an uninterrupted chain of possession of dismissed
firefighter's urine sample used in drug test, although courier did not sign and
date transmittal form or leave receipt with custodian, where sample was
immediately placed in sealed container, which was identified by a preprinted
number on a label covering the seal, the bag enclosing the container, and the
transmittal form, the seal with this identification number was unbroken when
laboratory received the sample, and custodian testified that he saw courier
remove sample from locked box.
[7] Evidence 157 150
157 Evidence
157IV Admissibility in General
157IV(E) Competency
157k150 k. Results of Experiments. Most
Cited Cases
The
determination whether the chain of custody of a drug sample has been
sufficiently established to justify admission of test results is committed to
the discretion of the trier of fact.
[8] Evidence 157 150
157 Evidence
157IV Admissibility in General
157IV(E) Competency
157k150 k. Results of Experiments. Most
Cited Cases
Evidence
of a drug test should be admitted if there is a reasonable probability that the
evidence has not been changed in important respects; thus, it is not necessary
for the party introducing such evidence to negate every possibility of
substitution.
[9] Evidence 157 150
157 Evidence
157IV Admissibility in General
157IV(E) Competency
157k150 k. Results of Experiments. Most
Cited Cases
The links
in the chain of custody of a urine sample or other similar evidence of a drug
test are not required to be established by any particular form of evidence.
**445*562 Yolanda Adrianzen, City of Paterson Corporation Counsel, for appellant (Frank
Covello, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of
counsel and on the brief).
William
J. De Marco, Wayne, for respondent.
John
J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, for respondent
Merit System Board (June K. Forrest, Senior Deputy Attorney General, on the
statement in lieu of brief).
Before
Judges SKILLMAN and LISA.
The
opinion of the court was delivered by
SKILLMAN, P.J.A.D.
The City
of Paterson appeals from a final decision of the Merit System Board (Board),
which rejected a recommended initial decision of an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) upholding the City's removal of appellant Mario Lalama from his firefighter
position for using cocaine. The sole ground of the Board's decision was that
the City failed to present adequate evidence of the “chain of custody” of the
urine sample that tested positive for cocaine.
After
informing his supervisors that he had an alcohol abuse problem, appellant was
placed on paid sick leave and admitted into a residential substance abuse
program for one month. Upon returning to active duty, appellant entered into an
agreement with the City that he would be placed on probation. One of the
conditions of appellant's probation was that he submit to random drug testing.
Armando
Cortez was the Paterson Fire Department official responsible for administering
drug tests to firefighters, which involved taking a urine sample and sending it
to an independent laboratory for analysis. Cortez had processed more than 100
urine samples before taking the sample from appellant that resulted in the
termination of his employment.
Appellant's
urine sample was taken on the morning of September 9, 1996, in the main
bathroom at Fire Headquarters. Appellant
*563 voided into a container provided by Cortez, then sealed the
container and placed his initials on the seal. Appellant placed the container
in a bag, and both he and Cortez signed the form that accompanied the container
when it was sent to the laboratory. The same preprinted identification number
that was on the form also was placed on a label affixed to the seal on the
container and the bag enclosing the container. Cortez retained a copy of the
form and gave a copy to appellant. Cortez placed the bag containing the urine
sample in a locked box for which only he and the laboratory's courier had keys.
He then **446 called the courier to pick up the sample and later that
afternoon observed the courier come and take the sample. However, the courier
did not fill in the blank for his signature on the transmittal form, and Cortez
failed to obtain a receipt from him.
The urine
sample was received by the testing laboratory, Laboratory Corporation of
America, the following day, September 10, 1996, with the seal on the container
still intact, accompanied by two copies of the chain of custody transmittal
form that included the preprinted identification number. The laboratory
confirmed that the identification number on the urine sample container
conformed with the number on the form, and when it analyzed the sample, it
tested positive for cocaine.
After
Paterson received the results of the drug test, it suspended appellant,
effective September 18, 1996, and charged him with conduct unbecoming a public
employee, in violation of N.J.A.C.
4A:2-2.3(a)(6); violating the Fire Department's
rules and regulations, in violation of N.J.A.C.
4A:2-2.3(a)(11); failing to conduct his private
life in such a manner as to avoid bringing the Department into disrepute, in
violation of section 2:1.1 of the municipal ordinance governing the conduct of
Fire Department employees; and taking drugs not duly prescribed and necessary
for health, in violation of section 2:2.12 of the ordinance.
After a
departmental hearing, appellant was found guilty of the charges and removed
from his position, effective April 15, 1997.
*564 Appellant appealed his removal to
the Board, which referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Law. Based
on the evidence presented at a hearing, an ALJ concluded that appellant was
guilty of the charges of conduct unbecoming a public employee, failing to
conduct his private life in such a manner as to avoid bringing the Fire
Department into disrepute and taking drugs not duly prescribed and necessary
for health. With specific reference to the chain of custody of appellant's
urine sample, the ALJ stated:
There is
no dispute that the container after collection was sealed with a label with a
unique number and signed by Lalama, and that the sealed container was placed in
a plastic specimen bag with the same unique number and that Lalama signed the
appropriate forms. There is also no dispute that the specimen container in the
sealed bag arrived at the LabCorp that night with the seals intact. The
irregularity in the chain of custody is that the courier that picked up the
specimen did not sign the form but Cortez saw him pick it up and the person who
received the specimen at the lab signed the form. I FIND that the evidence
presented demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the sealed
specimen that arrived at LabCorp is the same specimen given by Lalama.
The ALJ
further concluded that because appellant already had been placed on probation
for substance abuse and participated in a rehabilitation program, the
appropriate sanction for continued substance abuse was removal from the
position of firefighter.
The Board
rejected the ALJ's recommended initial decision and reversed Paterson's removal
of appellant from the position of firefighter solely on the ground that
Paterson had not presented adequate evidence of the chain of custody of the
urine sample:
[T]he
Board recognizes that two “links” in the chain of custody have been broken. In
particular, the City has no record of the date and time the urine sample was
picked up. Nor is there a record **447 of the individual who made the
pick up. Furthermore, LabCorp's forms were not accurately completed since there
is no record of the mode of transportation of the sample. Therefore, the Board
determines that the chain of custody of the subject urine sample was broken and
that the integrity of the sample was compromised. Accordingly, based on an invalid
drug test, there is insufficient evidence in the record to sustain the charges
lodged against appellant and the Board concludes that the removal should be
vacated.
[1] [2] An appellate
court's review of an administrative agency's findings of fact is limited to a
determination of whether those findings are supported by “sufficient credible
evidence in the *565 record.” In
re Taylor,
158 N.J.
644, 657, 731 A.2d
35 (1999). However, “an appellate court's review
... is ‘not simply a pro forma exercise in which [the court] rubber
stamp[s] findings that are not reasonably supported by the evidence.’ ” Ibid.
(quoting Chou
v. Rutgers,
283 N.J.Super.
524, 539, 662 A.2d
986 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 145
N.J.
374, 678 A.2d
714 (1996)).
“Appellate courts must engage in a ‘careful and principled consideration
of the agency record and findings.’ ” Id. at 657-58, 731
A.2d
35 (quoting Mayflower
Securities Co. v. Bureau of Securities,
64 N.J.
85, 93, 312 A.2d
497 (1973)).
[3] [4] [5] In a case where an administrative agency's findings of
fact are contrary to the findings of the ALJ who heard the case, there is a
particularly strong need for careful appellate review. Although an agency is
not required to defer to an ALJ's findings, it “is not free to brush aside or
disregard [them] without comment.” In
re Waterfront Dev. Permit No. WD88-0443-1,
244 N.J.Super.
426, 436, 582 A.2d
1018 (App.Div.1990), certif. denied, 126
N.J.
320, 598 A.2d
880 (1991); see also P.F.
v. New Jersey Div. of Developmental Disabilities,
139 N.J.
522, 530, 656 A.2d
1 (1995). In fact, if an agency's fact finding is
based on the credibility of witnesses, “a reviewing court need give no
deference to the agency ... on the credibility issue.” Clowes
v. Terminix Int'l, Inc.,
109 N.J.
575, 587-88, 538 A.2d
794 (1988); accord Steinmann
v. State, Dep't of the Treasury, Div. of Pensions, Teachers' Pension and
Annuity Fund,
116 N.J.
564, 576, 562 A.2d
791 (1989).
[6] [7] [8] The sole basis of the Board's decision was that the City
failed to present adequate evidence of the chain of custody of appellant's
urine sample. The determination whether the chain of custody of a drug sample
has been sufficiently established to justify admission of test results is
committed to the discretion of the trier of fact. See State
v. Morton,
155 N.J.
383, 446-47, 715 A.2d
228 (1998), aff'd 165
N.J.
235, 757 A.2d
184 (2000), cert. denied, ---
U.S. ----, 121 S.Ct.
1380, 149 L.Ed.2d
306 (2001); State
v. Brunson,
132 N.J.
377, 393, 625 A.2d
1085 (1993). Such evidence should be admitted if
there is a “reasonable probability *566
that the evidence has not been changed in important respects.” Id.
at 393-94, 625 A.2d
1085 (quoting State
v. Brown,
99 N.J.Super.
22, 28, 238 A.2d
482 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 51
N.J.
468, 242 A.2d
16 (1968)). Thus, it is not necessary for the
party introducing such evidence “to negate every possibility of substitution.” Brown,
supra,
99 N.J.Super.
at 27, 238 A.2d
482; see generally McCormick
on Evidence
§ 212 (Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
Although
the reported New Jersey appellate decisions involving chain of custody issues
have all been criminal cases, it is even clearer in an administrative
proceeding that a party seeking to introduce drug test results only needs to
show a “reasonable probability” that the integrity of the sample has been
maintained, because a **448 relaxed standard of admissibility of
evidence applies in administrative proceedings. See N.J.S.A.
52:14B-10(a). This conclusion is supported by
decisions in other jurisdictions that have applied the “reasonable probability”
test in determining whether the “chain of custody” of a urine sample or other
similar evidence was adequately demonstrated to justify the admission of test
results in an administrative agency hearing. See, e.g., Mollette
v. Kentucky Personnel Bd.,
997 S.W.2d
492, 495 (Ky.Ct.App.1999); Williamson
v. Police Bd. of Chicago,
182 Ill.App.3d
304, 130 Ill.Dec.
729, 537 N.E.2d
1058, 1061-63 (1989), appeal denied, 127
Ill.2d
644, 136 Ill.Dec.
611, 545 N.E.2d
135 (1989).
The ALJ
correctly determined that the City made the required showing of an
uninterrupted chain of possession of appellant's urine sample. That sample was
immediately placed in a sealed container, which was identified by a preprinted
number that was placed on a label covering the seal, the bag enclosing the
container, and the transmittal form that accompanied the sample when it was
sent to the laboratory for testing. When the laboratory received the sample,
the seal with this identification number was unbroken. Furthermore, even though
the laboratory's courier did not sign and date the transmittal form or leave a
receipt with Cortez, Cortez testified that he saw the courier remove the
sample *567 from the locked box
in which he had placed the sample, and the ALJ credited that testimony.
[9] The Board's conclusion that “two ‘links' in the chain of
custody [were] broken,” was based solely on the fact that the courier failed to
sign the transmittal form or note the date and time and that the laboratory's
form did not record how the sample had been transported. The Board failed to
consider other evidence showing the reliability of the transmittal of
appellant's urine sample, including the laboratory's receipt of the sealed
container with the preprinted identification number together with the
transmittal form signed by appellant and Cortez that included the same
transmittal number and Cortez's testimony that he saw the laboratory's courier
pick up the urine sample. The links in the chain of custody of a urine sample
or other similar evidence are not required to be established by any particular
form of evidence. See Brown,
supra,
99 N.J.Super.
at 28, 238 A.2d
482; see also Middlesex
County Dept. of Health v. Importico,
315 N.J.Super.
397, 423-25, 718 A.2d
727 (Law Div.1998). Thus, even though the courier
failed to complete the transmittal forms, the mode of transportation of the
urine sample from the Paterson Fire Department to the laboratory and the
integrity of the sample was demonstrated by compelling other evidence that the
ALJ found credible. Therefore, there is no basis in the record for the Board's
rejection of the ALJ's recommended decision.
Because
the Board reversed the City's removal of appellant from the firefighter
position solely based on its erroneous view that the City failed to present
adequate evidence of the chain of custody, it did not address the other issues
presented by appellant. Accordingly, we reverse the Board's final decision and
remand the matter to the agency. Jurisdiction is not retained.
N.J.Super.A.D.,2001.
In re
Lalama
343
N.J.Super. 560, 779 A.2d 444, 17 IER Cases 1735
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